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I. INTRODUCTION
From relative obscurity as a simple phrase defining conduct,
"bad faith" has rocketed into prominence as an often utilized and
more frequently threatened tort theory of recovery. The "fleshing
out" process of the new tort is in its infancy. The plethora of fac-
tual circumstances in which application of the doctrine is sought is
indicative of the common appeal of the remedy and uncertainty
about its scope.1
* B.S., Montana State College; J.D., University of Montana, 1969. Mr. Graham is a
partner in the firm of Garlington, Lohn & Robinson in Missoula, Montana.
** B.A., University of Montana; J.D., University of Montana, 1977. Mr. Luck is an
associate in the firm of Garlington, Lohn & Robinson in Missoula, Montana.
1. For an excellent discussion of the early history of the bad faith tort in Montana, see
Harman, An Insurer's Liability for the Tort of Bad Faith, 42 MoNT. L. REV. 67 (1981).
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There are essentially four different contexts in which the tort
theory of bad faith is presently being urged: first party liability,
first party benefit, third party, and non-insurance actions. Al-
though the terminology and elements are essentially the same in
each context, each involves its own special considerations in
application.
First party liability actions involve the relationship of an in-
sured and an insurer arising out of a liability insurance policy.2
These usually involve assertions of failure to settle within policy
limits, failure to defend, failure to investigate, or failure to accom-
plish some other duty specifically expressed by the policy or re-
quired by statute. First party benefit actions involve suits directly
against an insurer for benefits claimed to be due under an insur-
ance contract.3 Most commonly, these are simply suits for damages
arising from either failure to pay or wrongful termination of
health, disability, life, and other insurance benefits.
The remaining application in a liability insurance context is
the most recent and clearly most controversial. It involves a third
party action against an insurer which may be prosecuted in addi-
tion to the party's tort action against the insured.4 Finally, there
are "bad faith" actions in other contexts which, although slow in
their initial development, have the potential of becoming as signifi-
cant as the insurance suits.5
In recent years, societal demands for relief from "bad faith"
activities by both insurance and non-insurance entities have com-
bined with legislative and judicial activities making such relief
available. This coalescence of demand and availability of remedy
will undoubtedly initiate a burst of activities to define the parame-
ters of the remedy. As a consequence, much of the speculation nec-
essarily involved in the prognostication of the future of the "bad
faith" action will be rapidly eliminated.
This article is inspired primarily by a concern over the ques-
Some duplication of information from that article has been necessary to provide the proper
context for the present discussion.
2. First party liability actions most frequently involve the failure of an insurer to per-
form the obligations it has assumed under an automobile liability policy. Problems may also
arise, however, under other types of liability policies.
3. This situation differs from first party liability and third party direct actions because
it involves only the insured and the insurer.
4. These unique actions arise from situations where liability insurance is in force pro-
tecting the insured against tort liability. The injured party not only relies on the insured's
right to indemnification under the policy, but can also proceed directly against the insur-
ance company for certain violations of statutory law.
5. Bad faith principles have been applied in Montana to cases involving employment
contracts, workers' compensation, and attorney's fees.
[Vol. 45
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tions presented, but unanswered, by the Montana Supreme Court's
recent decision in Klaudt v. Flink.0 These difficult problems, in-
volving both substantive and procedural matters, are now being
faced on an increasingly frequent basis by counsel for claimants,
insureds, and insurers, and by the insurance personnel who make
critical decisions in these areas daily.
II. POLICY BACKGROUND
Insurance policies, which provide the basic relationship upon
which the "good faith" obligation is formed, have (at least in re-
cent years) almost universally been deemed contracts of adhesion.
As a consequence, courts have almost always construed contract
provisions that could be deemed ambiguous in favor of the insured
and against the insurer.8 In good part, this approach to interpreta-
tion of insurance policies stems from the unequal bargaining posi-
tion inherent in mass-produced and mass-marketed insurance poli-
cies. Legislative awareness of possible inequities in the insurer-
insured relationship has led over the years to supervision of the
insurance industry as a quasi-public entity.9 The attempt to mini-
mize the perceived inequities in bargaining positions culminated in
Montana in the 1977 adoption of section 33-18-201 of the Montana
Code Annotated, 0 prohibiting unfair claim settlement practices.
That section imposes duties and responsibilities upon insurance
companies in addition to the strict language of the insurance
contract. "
6. - Mont. -, 658 P.2d 1065 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Aetna Ins. Co., 176 Mont. 186, 191, 577 P.2d 370, 373 (1978).
8. Oleson v. Farmers Ins. Group, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 166, 169 (1980); Lindell v.
Ruthford, 183 Mont. 135, 140, 598 P.2d 616, 618 (1979); Atcheson v. Safeco Ins. Co., 165
Mont. 239, 247, 527 P.2d 549, 553 (1974).
9. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
10. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201 (1983). Section 33-18-201 is commonly and inaccu-
rately referred to as the "Unfair Trade Practices Act." It is actually one of various statutes
making up chapter 18 of title 33, which chapter is entitled "Unfair Trade Practices." Sec-
tion 33-18-201 itself has no specific title other than the descriptive heading, "Unfair claim
settlement practices prohibited." In construing the statute in Klaudt v. Flink, Mont.
-, 658 P.2d 1065, 1066, the court somewhat ambiguously referred to it as being part of
the "Unfair Trade Practices Section of the Montana Insurance Code." Care should be taken
not to confuse § 33-18-201 with the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 1973, which is codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 to -604 (1983).
11. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201 (1983) provides in its entirety:
Unfair claim settlement practices prohibited. No person may, with such frequency
as to indicate a general business practice, do any of the following:
(1) misrepresent pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to cover-
ages at issue;
(2) fail to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies;
1984]
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One of the prime factors behind expansions of the insurer's
obligations is the need to align the expectations of the insured
when he purchases the policy with the ultimate result obtained
when a claim is made under that policy. An individual purchases
an insurance policy with the expectations that the insurer will in-
demnify him against losses within the coverage limitations of the
policy. The insured seeks to purchase protection and security. This
expectation is perhaps justified, if not entirely motivated, by insur-
ers' advertisements promising security and freedom from worry. 2
Frequently, economic duress has been the chief bargaining
tool of insurers. Disputes between insureds and insurers typically
result from threatened or actual financial losses by insureds. Fail-
ure to pay proper claims has an adverse social effect. Conversely,
payment of all claims without regard to the appropriateness of the
claim has adverse effects because of the extreme price society
would have to pay. The proper balance is difficult to find and
maintain. The legislature has taken away much of the insurer's
(3) fail to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation
of claims arising under insurance policies;
(4) refuse to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon
all available information;
(5) fail to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of
loss statements have been completed;
(6) neglect to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable set-
tlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;
(7) compel insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insur-
ance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in
actions brought by such insureds;
(8) attempt to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable man
would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed advertising
material accompanying or made part of an application;
(9) attempt to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered with-
out notice to or knowledge or consent of the insured;
(10) make claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by state-
ments setting forth the coverage under which the payments are being made;
(11) make known to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from arbitration
awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to
accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration;
(12) delay the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claim-
ant, or physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report and then requiring
the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which submis-
sions contain substantially the same information;
(13) fail to promptly settle claims, if liability has become reasonably clear, under
one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements
under other portions of the insurance policy coverage; or
(14) fail to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insur-
ance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the
offer of a compromise settlement.
12. See Gay, Tort of Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Claims, 82 W.
VA. L. REv. 579, 579-82 (1980).
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ability to take advantage of its insureds by economic duress. The
courts, by developing the new bad faith tort, have as a practical
matter given the insured the ability to use economic duress as a
bargaining tool.
III. FIRST PARTY LIABILITY ACTIONS
A. Early Federal Decisions
The first firm steps toward the adoption of a separate bad
faith cause of action in Montana occurred in 1962 in Jessen v.
O'Daniel,3 a federal district court case. Judge Jameson provided
the groundwork. Jessen involved a claim for failure to settle a lia-
bility claim within policy limits. Judge Jameson's threshold task
was to recognize the company's obligation to exercise ordinary care
and diligence in several respects, and to delineate the parameters
of that responsibility.14 After examining each of the specific acts
alleged, Judge Jameson detailed several rules of law which, to this
day, remain the primary considerations in Montana first party lia-
bility situations. The mere fact that an insurer is unsuccessful in
its defense of the insured at trial is insufficient to show that the
defense was not made in good faith. Error in judgment alone does
not provide a sufficient basis for holding an insurer liable in excess
of its express policy limits.15 Dwarfing those two rules, however,
was one which has been a harbinger of the developments in this
area: "the insurer must give the interests of its insured equal con-
sideration with its own interests and must in all respects deal fairly
with the insured.""8
As a prelude to the determination of what constituted bad
faith, Judge Jameson faced the decision that had troubled other
courts: whether to apply a traditional negligence analysis or, in-
stead, to adopt the relatively new concept of recovery for breach of
a fiduciary duty to act in good faith. In this respect Judge Jame-
son's dilemma was similar to that faced by a California appellate
court in Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co.17 a few years earlier. In
13. 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont. 1962), affd sub noma. Nat'l Farmers Union Property &
Casualty Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1964).
14. Judge Jameson found that the insurer was obliged to exercise reasonable care in
(1) investigating and interviewing witnesses; (2) giving due consideration to applicable law;
(3) adequately preparing for trial; (4) appraising and evaluating for settlement; and (5) ne-
gotiating settlement where a fair appraisal of the case so required. Jessen, 210 F. Supp. at
319.
15. Id. at 325.
16. Id. at 326.
17. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
1984]
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Brown the court analogized the relationship of insured and insurer
to that of principal and agent or beneficiary and trustee, and found
that any liability on the insurer's part for failure to settle within
policy limits had to be based on bad faith rather than mere negli-
gence. 18 Although the court treated the insured's action as one
arising out of tort rather than contract, it looked to the insurance
contract to gauge the extent of the insurer's duty. Because a policy
expressly limits indemnification, it would be "a harsh measure to
hold the insurer liable for amounts often far in excess of the agreed
limit."19 The court therefore found substantial culpability to be a
prerequisite for recovery.
The analysis by Judge Jameson in Jessen seems to have fol-
lowed the same reasoning. The essential question-whether an in-
surer's only obligation is to act in good faith or whether it is addi-
tionally required to exercise due care-was duly posed. The court's
conclusion clearly adopted, at least for the purposes of that case,
the bad faith theory of recovery. It is obvious from the way the
court reviewed the two theories that the negligence test would con-
stitute a stricter scrutiny of an insurer's conduct than the bad faith
test.20 Since the insurer was found to have exercised bad faith in
relation to its insured, there was no need to examine further the
applicability of negligence.
In Jessen the court also established the factors to be consid-
ered in a "failure to settle" bad faith case. They are:
(1) whether, by reason of the severity of the plaintiff's injuries,
any verdict is likely to be greatly in excess of the policy limits; (2)
whether the facts in the case indicate that a defendant's verdict
on the issue of liability is doubtful; (3) whether the company has
given due regard to the recommendations of its trial counsel; (4)
whether the insured has been informed of all settlement demands
and offers; (5) whether the insured has demanded that the insurer
settle within policy limits; (6) whether the company has given due
consideration to any offer of contribution made by the insured.21
It is noteworthy that the court did not attempt to articulate a
precise definition of bad faith but rather observed that each case
must be decided on its own facts. Judge Jameson also pointed out
that each of the six factors must be considered in determining
whether the company has exercised good faith and that no single
factor is decisive. Jessen thus provided an early example of bad
18. Id. at 685, 319 P.2d at 74.
19. Id.
20. 210 F. Supp. at 326.
21. Id. at 326-29 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 45
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faith as an independent tort in Montana without clearly articulat-
ing the bounds of the new concept.
Judge Jameson was also the author of the second excursion
into bad faith in Montana. Fetter Livestock Co. v. National Farm-
ers Union Property & Casualty Co.,22 decided in 1966, also in-
volved an alleged breach of duty to settle within policy limits.
Again the insured alleged negligence and bad faith. The court ap-
plied the Jessen rules and made specific reference to the language
of the Ninth Circuit in its affirmation of the Jessen decision.2 3 The
Ninth Circuit had clearly stated that it is the breach of the fiduci-
ary duty of the insurance company to look after the interests of the
insured as well as its own that gives rise to a bad faith action.24
One interesting feature of Fetter is that the opinion referred
to negligence and bad faith almost interchangeably. The court
spoke of "negligently and in bad faith" ' and "negligence or bad
faith, ' 26 and asked whether the insurer "breached its fiduciary
duty to its insured and was guilty of bad faith. '27 Judge Jameson
concluded that under the facts the plaintiff failed to establish neg-
ligence or bad faith in the insurer's handling of the defense, in-
cluding its failure to pay the settlement demand.
B. Montana Cases
In Fowler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,2 8
a 1969 case, the Montana Supreme Court had the opportunity to
rule directly on the question of the insurer's liability for failure to
accept a settlement offer within its policy limits.29 The Montana
court adopted the reasoning of Jessen and Fetter, particularly not-
ing the insurer's fiduciary duty to look after the interests of the
insured as well as its own.
Since the Fowler complaint was framed in terms of negligence
and bad faith, both issues were examined. Applying the six-factor
22. 257 F. Supp. 4 (D. Mont. 1966).
23. Id. at 10.
24. Nat'l Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60, 64-65 (9th
Cir. 1964).
25. Fetter, 257 F. Supp. at 13.
26. Id. at 14.
27. Id. at 10-11.
28. 153 Mont. 74, 454 P.2d 76 (1969).
29. State Farm had $10,000 policy limits but offered only $2500 on behalf of the in-
sured. Claimant demanded $7500; unable to settle, claimant proceeded to trial and was
awarded slightly more than $20,000. State Farm paid about $10,000 and the insured settled
the remaining portion of the judgment for $4000. In the suit alleging negligence and bad
faith, the insured obtained reimbursement of the $4000 plus attorney's fees from State
Farm.
1984]
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Jessen test, the court ultimately concluded that there was a lack of
proof of any bad faith or even anything amounting to negligence
sufficient to show a lack of good faith. Again, negligence seemed to
be treated as an appropriate theory of recovery, but with second-
ary status to the theory of bad faith arising from breach of the
insurer's fiduciary duty.
The 1973 decision in Thompson v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. 3 0 involved a claim of bad faith in the in-
surer's handling of the insured's defense. The unsuccessful defense
resulted in a judgment in excess of policy limits. The action
against State Farm also involved a claim for failure to settle within
policy limits.3 1
The case is particularly significant because of its apparently
approving reference to the definition of bad faith in the trial
court's instructions-a rare attempt at a succinct definition of bad
faith in the reported Montana cases. The trial court instructed the
jury that bad faith was "a willful failure to respond to plain and
well-understood obligation. 3 2 The requirement of willfulness ech-
oes the culpability requirement in Brown v. Guarantee Insurance
Co.33 In Thompson, the court reversed a judgment in favor of the
insured because of lack of proof of bad faith or negligence amount-
ing to bad faith. The court did not discuss further or attempt to
quantify the amount or type of negligence that would have
amounted to bad faith.
The Thompson court, in applying the six-factor Jessen test,
noted that in reviewing the conduct of the insurer it is inappropri-
ate to utilize "20-20 hindsight vision." s' The conduct under scru-
tiny had to be considered in light of the circumstances existing at
the time. A microscopic examination, years after the fact, made
with the luxury of actually knowing the outcome of the original
proceeding was not appropriate. Such a rule limiting the applica-
tion of hindsight is consistent with the purposes of the bad faith
theory. It must be remembered that if bad faith exists in a given
situation it arose upon the occurrence of the acts in question; bad
faith does not arise at some later date as a result of an unsuccess-
30. 161 Mont. 207, 505 P.2d 423 (1973).
31. There was some uncertainty under the facts in Thompson as to whether a demand
within policy limits was made, and whether the insurer kept the insured informed of all
offers and demands. In any event, the court found that four of the six Jessen factors were
not implicated, so that evidence of bad faith was lacking. Thompson, 161 Mont. at 217-19,
505 P.2d at 428-30.
32. Id. at 219, 505 P.2d at 430.
33. See supra text accompanying note 19.
34. Thompson, 161 Mont. at 217, 505 P.2d at 429.
[Vol. 45
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ful day in court.
Thompson collaterally involved another issue which to date
has not been specifically addressed by the Montana Supreme
Court. The jury, in addition to awarding general damages for bad
faith, also awarded $750 to the insured for mental pain and suffer-
ing. Because the judgment was reversed on the bad faith issue, it
was unnecessary to decide whether mental pain and suffering con-
stitute a valid element of damages in a bad faith case.
Lipinski v. Title Insurance Co., 85 a 1982 case, involved both
first party liability and first party benefit claims. Lipinski claimed
that the title company not only failed to determine and disclose
easements on the property he was purchasing, but also failed to
provide a defense for him in two lawsuits arising from those undis-
closed rights. The first party liability claim arose in the context of
the title company's assertion that punitive damages should not
have been awarded for its failure to defend Lipinski.
The trial court had concluded that the title company acted in
bad faith in refusing to defend Lipinski. The supreme court left no
room for doubt as to whether an independent tort of bad faith ex-
isted. It stated: "Should there be any doubt, we now expressly hold
that insurance companies have a duty to act in good faith with
their insureds, and that this duty exists independent of the insur-
ance contract and independent of statute."3 6 Although the actual
damages awarded were based on breach of contract, the court
found that they could as easily have been found to flow from the
"prima facie tort of bad faith," thus supporting an award of puni-
tive damages."7
In summary, bad faith resulting from a breach of the fiduciary
duty owed by an insurer to its insured is the preferred form of
recovery in first party liability actions. Negligence remains a factor
but is only operative if it is sufficient to amount to bad faith. All
actions must be judged in the context of the time and place in
which they occurred. Willful or culpable conduct appears to be a
prerequisite. Error in judgment is not sufficient to establish bad
faith. The fact that the underlying suit results in a judgment in
excess of policy limits does not by itself establish bad faith. The
right to recover when there is a question of failure to settle within
policy limits is conditioned upon passing the six-factor test estab-
lished in Jessen. Damages consist of the amount of the excess
judgment, attorney's fees, and, in the appropriate case, punitive
35. - Mont. -, 655 P.2d 970 (1982).
36. Id. at __, 655 P.2d at 977.
37. Id.
1984]
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damages. The question of whether, in this context, recovery is al-
lowed for mental pain and suffering, has not been answered.
IV. FIRST PARTY BENEFIT ACTIONS
A. Initial Development
The second area of bad faith-first party benefit ac-
tions-involves attempts by insureds to recover benefits to which
they are entitled under their insurance policy. In such situations,
plaintiffs have traditionally sought recovery of withheld benefits by
bringing a breach of contract action. The exclusivity of that theory
of recovery began to crumble in 1967 with the Montana Supreme
Court's decision in State ex rel. Larson v. District Court."8
The action was based on a credit disability insurance policy
issued to the purchaser of a used car. In addition to seeking bene-
fits due under the contract, the insured also sought exemplary
damages based on the insurer's allegedly fraudulent acts. The in-
surer, relying on well-established precedent, claimed that such
damages were improper in a simple contract action. The court,
noting that the insured had also asserted a violation of insurance
laws, upheld his right to proceed with his punitive damages
claim. 9
The situation arose again in Helton v. Reserve Life Insurance
Co.,40 a federal district court case. The insurer had moved to strike
claims for punitive damages and emotional distress arising from
the insurer's failure to pay benefits promptly. Relying on Larson,
the court refused to strike the punitive damage claim. The court
dismissed the emotional distress claim, however, in essence pre-
dicting that the Montana Supreme Court would not have found
liability for emotional distress caused by nonviolent conduct where
there was no fear for personal safety. Although the conduct of the
insurer was alleged to be "bad," the court characterized it as
amounting to no more than a deliberate stalling and an ultimate
failure to pay. It was not the "extreme misconduct" required for
38. 149 Mont. 131, 423 P.2d 598 (1967).
39. After termination of disability payments, the insured sued for breach of the con-
tractual obligation to pay benefits, also alleging that this breach violated Montana law in a
malicious, oppressive, and fraudulent manner. The insurer, relying upon Westfall v. Motors
Ins. Corp., 140 Mont. 564, 374 P.2d 96 (1962), argued that punitive damages were not proper
in a contract action. The court distinguished Westfall on the basis that the insured there
had not alleged a statutory violation. In Larson, the insured alleged a breach of MosT. Rv.
CODES ANN. § 40-4011 (1947) (requiring indemnification immediately upon receipt of proof
of loss).
40. 399 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Mont. 1975).
[Vol. 45
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recovery."1
In 1979, the Montana Supreme Court directly discussed bad
faith in a first party benefit case. First Security Bank v. Goddard42
arose from a dispute over liability under a policy of credit disabil-
ity insurance. As in Larson, the court noted that a cause of action
may sound in tort although it arises out of a breach of contract.43
This occurs where the breach of contract also breaches a duty
owed independently of the contract." The court found that the in-
surer not only had the contractual duty to make payment of valid
claims, but also had a statutory duty to do so.4 5 A breach of statu-
tory duty gave rise to tort liability and allowed, as a measure of
damages, the tort compensation standard. In dicta, the court noted
that "the insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing with its in-
sureds in the payment of claims has statutory blessing and author-
ity."46 This brief mention of good faith and fair dealing signaled
the direction of future cases relating to first party benefits in Mon-
tana. Interestingly, this initial-and rather indirect-mention of
good faith in a first party benefit context came more than a decade
after the initial adoption of bad faith principles in a first party
liability action.47
B. Recent Cases
While most of the cases involving first party liability bad faith
claims arose before the 1980's, the first party benefit bad faith ac-
tion has developed in Montana in the last few years. The first of
these cases was Weber v. Blue Cross.4' The Weber majority held
that health service corporations, including Blue Cross, are not sub-
ject to the Montana Insurance Code.49 Because the trial court had
erroneously given instructions with respect to the Insurance Code,
41. Id. at 1323.
42. 181 Mont. 407, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979).
43. Id. at 419, 593 P.2d at 1047.
44. Id.
45. Id. The insurer's "independent" duty arose from MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-21-105
(1983), which requires that "[aill claims shall be settled as soon as possible and in accor-
dance with the terms of the insurance contract."
46. Goddard, 181 Mont. at 420, 593 P.2d at 1047.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32. Goddard was decided after the adoption
of § 33-18-201, but that statute was not mentioned, presumably because the suit arose
before the statute's effective date. For further discussion of Goddard, see Harman supra
note 1, at 85-89.
48. - Mont. - , 643 P.2d 198 (1982).
49. MONT. CODE ANN. title 33 constitutes the Montana Insurance Code [hereinafter
referred to as Insurance Code].
19841
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a judgment for plaintiff was reversed." The supreme court, how-
ever, affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a
directed verdict on a separate tort claim of bad faith, and ap-
proved submitting that issue to the jury.5 1 Blue Cross was thus
found to have an obligation to act in good faith with its members.
The rationale for imposing this duty of good faith was almost
precisely the same as that supporting the obligation of an insur-
ance company to deal in good faith. Blue Cross had a superior bar-
gaining position; its applicants had no voice in preparing their con-
tracts; and insured members were vulnerable to oppressive tactics
when filing a claim. 2
Following closely behind Weber was Lipinski v. Title Insur-
ance Co." The bad faith discussion related solely to breach of the
duty to defend a first party liability claim. The court, however, in
the first party benefit context, did find that a title company owes
its clients a duty of reasonable care in conducting a title search. It
concluded that a title policy would cover the damages resulting
from the negligent failure to note a title defect. The award of dam-
ages, based on the cost of removing the defect, was affirmed to the
extent of the policy limits.'4
Harris v. American General Life Insurance Co.5 carried the
concept of bad faith even further. American General had issued an
insurance policy under which Harris, the insured's father, was ben-
eficiary. There was a basic $10,000 benefit with a $10,000 acciden-
tal benefit rider. The accidental death benefit was not payable if
death resulted from suicide, voluntary or involuntary asphyxiation
by inhalation of gas, or taking of poison. The insured died under
questionable circumstances. The insurance company sent the
plaintiff a check for the basic benefits with a restrictive endorse-
ment constituting a full release if endorsed and negotiated .' The
50. Weber, - Mont. at - , 643 P.2d at 201-02. The case involved multiple theo-
ries of recovery: damages for contract benefits, wrongful cancellation, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, bad faith, and violation of the Insurance Code.
51. Id. at -, 643 P.2d at 203. In support of this part of its decision, the court cited
State ex rel. Dimler v. District Court, 170 Mont. 77, 550 P.2d 917 (1976), and Goddard. The
court recognized that Goddard involved an insurance contract (thus bringing into play the
Insurance Code), but found similar legal principles to apply in Weber.
52. Weber, - Mont. at * , 643 P.2d at 203.
53. - Mont. - , 655 P.2d 970 (1982). For another discussion of this case in a
different context, see supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
54. Id. at -, 655 P.2d at 976-78. Three justices dissented, finding no duty on the
part of a title company to make a title search, and no liability arising from a negligent title
examination. Id. at -, 655 P.2d at 979 (Weber, J., dissenting).
55. - Mont. -, 658 P.2d 1089 (1983).
56. The restrictive endorsement read: "Accepted in full and final settlement of all
claims against American General Life Insurance Company on Policy B 697465." Id. at -,
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insurance company initially refused to pay the accidental death
benefit because of the circumstances surrounding the insured's
death. Plaintiff refused to endorse the check and demanded uncon-
ditional payment of the face value of the basic policy proceeds.
Shortly after plaintiff filed suit, the company tendered a check for
the basic benefits with no restrictions.
Plaintiff proceeded to trial seeking the accidental death bene-
fits and punitive damages for bad faith. The jury awarded $30,000
in punitive damages because the insurance company had acted in
bad faith. The jury, however, refused to award the accidental
death benefits. 7 In other words, the jury found that the insurance
company's decision not to pay accidental death benefits was cor-
rect, but that the way in which it handled the matter deserved
punishment.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the company's vio-
lation of section 33-18-201 of the Montana Code Annotated,58 con-
stituted a statutory violation sufficient to support a punitive dam-
ages award as in Larson and Goddard." The import of that
conclusion is substantial. First, the court directly applied Section
33-18-201 to first party claims. Second, in what appears to be a
retreat from the Lipinski6" holding, the court seemed to require a
violation of the Insurance Code to sustain punitive damages.
The unfair claim settlement practices section requires a fre-
quency of unfair practices sufficient to indicate a general business
practice.6 1 Apparently the court found that condition satisfied by
the testimony of the manager of life and disability claims that
other claims were handled in a similar fashion.2
Although the jury did not award accidental death benefits, the
supreme court found that actual damages supporting the punitive
damages award existed by virtue of a loss of approximately three
months interest, a shortage in the premium refund of $14.11, and
attorney's fees. This case followed the trend, clearly apparent in
Lauman v. Lee63 and Miller v. Fox," toward virtual elimination of
658 P.2d at 1090.
57. Id. at -, 628 P.2d at 1091.
58. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201 (1983). Defendant was found to have violated subs.
(13), under which a person may not "fail to promptly settle claims, if liability has become
reasonably clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence
settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 38-47.
60. In Lipinski, - Mont. at -, 655 P.2d at 977, the independent tort of bad faith
was the basis upon which punitive damages were assessed.
61. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201 (1983).
62. Harris, - Mont. at -, 658 P.2d at 1092.
63. - Mont. - , 626 P.2d 830 (1981).
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the actual damages requirement.
The theory under which the Harris majority allowed recovery
of punitive damages was not without substantial dispute. Justice
Morrison did not agree that there was a violation of the Insurance
Code as a matter of law.5 Instead, he reminded the majority that
it was not necessary to find a violation of the Insurance Code to
support an award of punitive damages. According to Justice Morri-
son, the claim was grounded in the tort of bad faith and the jury
was consequently entitled to award punitive damages if it found
that the insurer's conduct was sufficiently culpable to satisfy the
requirements of oppression and malice.66 Justice Shea agreed that
the verdict should be affirmed on the basis that the insurance com-
pany did not act in good faith. He noted that the insurance com-
pany had a clear duty to settle immediately the part of the claim
that was undisputed, and that a jury could have concluded that
the failure immediately to settle was in bad faith. 7 Justice Weber,
in dissent,6 8 and Justice Shea in his concurrence agreed that sec-
tion 33-18-201 did not give rise to a private action in tort.
The most recent decision in the first party benefit context, St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Cumiskey,' 9 was a declara-
tory judgment action brought by an insurer.7 0 The counterclaim by
the insured, based on both statutory and common law duties to
settle insurance claims in good faith, was quickly disposed of by
the court. The statutory claim was deficient because the insured
did not plead or present any evidence that St. Paul had failed to
settle claims with such frequency as to indicate a general business
practice.7
The primary support for the common law counterclaim was
that the filing of the declaratory judgment action was in bad faith
since the claim should have been paid. The lower court entered a
directed verdict in favor of St. Paul and the supreme court af-
firmed. It held that in a proper case an insurer may use a declara-
tory judgment action in order to obtain a determination of the va-
lidity, continuance, or coverage of the insurance policy, a
64. 174 Mont. 504, 571 P.2d 804 (1977).
65. Harris, - Mont. at -, 658 P.2d at 1094 (Morrison, J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. Id. at , 658 P.2d at 1094-95 (Shea, J., concurring).
68. Id. at , 658 P.2d at 1094 (Weber, J., concurring).
69. - Mont. - , 665 P.2d 223 (1983).
70. The dispute involved a fire insurance policy. The insurer contested the claim on
the basis that the fire had been intentionally started and therefore was not within the cover-
age of the policy.
71. Cumiskey, - Mont. at -, 665 P.2d at 226.
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determination of the extent of liability, or a determination of the
insurer's duty under the policy.7" The appropriate use of such a
remedy does not necessarily constitute bad faith.
The general rules that can be derived from the first party ben-
efit cases are somewhat less specific than those from the first party
liability cases. Certainly it can be said that a common law tort ac-
tion in bad faith is recognized and is separate from the traditional
contract action. A majority of the Montana Supreme Court has
also found a statutory bad faith action arising out of violation of
section 33-18-201 of the Insurance Code.7" In such situations, a
court may award the amount of benefits withheld, attorney's fees
to collect those benefits, and punitive damages. Recovery for
mental pain and suffering and emotional distress has not been spe-
cifically approved.
V. THIRD PARTY ACTIONS
A. The California Development
Historically, an injured claimant could proceed directly
against the tortfeasor's insurance company only under direct ac-
tion statutes or under special limited circumstances. The rationale
was that the injured claimant was a stranger to the contract of in-
surance to whom the insurer owed no duty. Only after the injured
claimant obtained a judgment and the judgment remained unsatis-
fied could that "third party" proceed directly against the insurer in
the absence of a direct action statute.7 '
Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,75 a 1979 Califor-
nia case, signaled the beginning of the end of this isolation of the
insurer from the third party claimant. Royal Globe sent shock
waves through the insurance industry and defense bar and
prompted plaintiffs' and claimants' counsel in other jurisdictions
to attempt to obtain the same direct action result. Prior to Royal
Globe it had been held fundamental "that the insurer's duty to
settle was owed to the insured alone, and that no such duty was
owed to the injured party." 6 Just three years earlier, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court considered a variety of potential bases upon
which a duty might be extended to a third party claimant. It un-
72. Id. at -, 665 P.2d at 227.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 55-62.
74. See, e.g., Conley v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 98 Mont. 31, 37 P.2d 565
(1934).
75. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
76. Avila v. Travelers Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 431, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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equivocally rejected all of them on the basis that the duty to settle
was intended to benefit the insured and not the injured claimant."
In Royal Globe, the court abruptly reversed its former posi-
tion. In essence, the court held that a third party claimant could
sue an insurer for violating California's Unfair Trade Practices
Act.78 The key part of the holding was the court's determination
that the insurance statutes created a private cause of action in ad-
dition to providing for internal regulatory enforcement."' Royal
Globe strenuously argued that creation of such a private right was
not within the legislative intent or contemplation at the time the
statute was enacted. The court, however, relied on two earlier deci-
sions" in class actions to support its conclusion that a private right
of action existed. The court also rejected Royal Globe's argument
that, because the insurer's duty runs only to the insured, third
party claimants were precluded from relying on the Act for a the-
ory of recovery. The court determined that in listing the types of
prohibited conduct the California Legislature intended for the Act
to refer to the insurer's conduct toward both claimants and
insureds. 1
In allowing this new theory of recovery, the California court
placed some limitations on its use. Under Royal Globe, the insurer
and the insured may not be sued in the same lawsuit, and the suit
against the insurer may not proceed until the liability of the in-
sured is first determined. The purpose for these two rules is three-
fold: (1) to prevent the prejudicial use of evidence of liability in-
surance in an action against the insured; (2) to prevent the insured
from being prejudiced by discovery initiated by the injured claim-
ant against the insurer in the statutory action; and (3) to assist in
determining damages resulting from the insurer's breach by first
determining the amount of damages owed by the insured to the
77. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424
(1976). Murphy was distinguished in Royal Globe on the basis that the third party plaintiff
in the former case sought to rely on the insurer's contractual duty to its insured, whereas
the plaintiff in the latter case relied on a statutory duty owed by the insurer to a third party
claimant. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
78. The claimant relied on CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5) and (14) (West 1983). Subs.
(h)(5) is virtually identical to MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201(6) (1983), the statute at issue in
Klaudt v. Flink, - Mont. - , 658 P.2d 1065 (1983). Subs. (h)(14) prohibits "[d]irectly
advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney." Section 790.03 is the "prohib-
ited acts" provision of the "Unfair Practices" article, CAL. INs. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West
1972 & Supp. 1983). Under § 1620.2(a), that article is referred to as California's "Unfair
Trade Practices Act."
79. 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
80. Shernoff v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975); Green-
berg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
81. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 888-90, 592 P.2d at 334-35, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48.
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third party.82
Granting the claimant a right to sue an insurer directly consti-
tutes a fundamental change in the nature of the insurer's obliga-
tion. Good faith law previously required the exercise of fair deal-
ings and good faith between the insurer and the insured. The
insurer had been found responsible to its insured for the investiga-
tion, negotiation, and settlement of a case if appropriate. Royal
Globe requires, in obedience to California's Unfair Trade Practices
Act, prompt, fair, and equitable settlement when liability has be-
come reasonably clear. Although the interests of an insured and a
third party claimant are not always identical, Royal Globe appar-
ently obliges the insurer to satisfy both.
B. Klaudt v. Flink
Montana, like California, had a long uninterrupted history of
denying third party claimants a direct action against insurers. This
position shifted dramatically in Klaudt v. Flink.8 The case
reached the Montana Supreme Court on an appeal from a judg-
ment dismissing State Farm Mutual as a party defendant. As the
court articulated it,
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the Montana
Unfair Trade Practices section of the Insurance Code, specifically
section 33-18-201(6), MCA, gives the plaintiffs a cause of action
against a defendant's insurer which can be prosecuted jointly
with an action against the defendant insured?"
The court first recited the traditional rule that the duty to set-
tle was "a fiduciary duty running from the insurer to the in-
sured" 6 rather than to any third party claimant. The court refused
to accept, however, that the insurance commissioner's authority
under the Insurance Code is the exclusive remedy for unfair trade
practices." In addition to the commissioner's power to prevent or
82. Id. at 891-92, 590 P.2d at 336-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50.
83. - Mont. - , 658 P.2d at 1065 (1983).
84. Id. at - , 658 P.2d at 1066.
85. Id.
86. Under MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-1004(1) (1983), the commissioner is authorized to
issue desist orders to insurers who engage in unfair or deceptive acts. Under § 33-18-1005,
anyone who violates a valid cease and desist order is subject to a civil penalty of up to $1000
per day, not to exceed $10,000. In Klaudt, the court pointed to § 33-18-1005(5), which pro-
vides: "This section shall not be deemed to affect or prevent the imposition of any penalty
provided by this code or by other law for violation of any other provision of this chapter,
whether or not any such hearing is called or held or such desist order issued."
Applying the rules of statutory construction set out in Montana Power Co. v. Cremer,
182 Mont. 277, 596 P.2d 483 (1979), the court held that the legislature intended to provide a
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punish violations, the court held that a private civil cause of action
could be maintained under section 33-18-201. The court found that
the legislature intended to impose on insurers an obligation to
claimants as well as to insureds. To this extent, the Montana deci-
sion paralleled Royal Globe. Based on the statute, claimants were
found to have a direct private right of action against the
tortfeasor's insurance company.
In addition to adopting the third party direct action, the court
provided assistance to claimants in procedural matters relating to
the new remedy. Section 33-18-201 of the Montana Code Anno-
tated specifies that the statute is violated when unfair claim settle-
ment practices occur "with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice. '87 The court noted that this proviso constitutes
a limitation on the pursuit of third party actions, but also held
that multiple violations of the statute arising in the course of a
single claim could be sufficient to establish the requisite business
practice frequency.88
The most controversial of the procedural rulings in Klaudt re-
lates to the timing of the actions. The Klaudt majority specifically
held that the third party action "may be filed and tried before,
concurrent with, or after liability has been determined. 8' No other
court has allowed such a result.90 The obvious question of the ef-
fect of concurrent trials on the traditional prohibition against men-
tion of insurance coverage in liability actions was raised but dis-
posed of summarily. The court simply noted that Rule 411 of the
Montana Rules of Evidence' prohibits the introduction of evi-
dence of insurance coverage only "where it is offered for the pur-
pose of showing negligence or liability."9 2 Since the issues of bad
faith and negligence or liability would be tried separately, the
court concluded that the rule would not be violated.
The majority properly realized that many would view the re-
sult as being harsh. Justice Morrison, citing potential confusion
and prejudice, dissented from the court's conclusion that the cases
could be consolidated and tried before the same jury. He agreed,
however, that section 33-18-201 created a private right of action
that may be brought at any time so long as it is not consolidated
private civil action for breaches of insurers' obligations. Klaudt, - Mont. at , 658
P.2d at 1067.
87. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201 (1983).
88. - Mont. at -, 658 P.2d at 1068.
89. Id. at -, 658 P.2d at 1067 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. MONT. R. EVID. 411.
92. Klaudt, Mont. at -, 658 P.2d at 1068.
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with the action against the tortfeasor.9a Justices Weber9" and
Shea,95 consistent with their opinions in first party cases, disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the statute created a private
cause of action. Justice Shea observed:
By interpreting the statutes as permitting third party claims
against insurance companies who insure an alleged tort feasor, we
have ignored the plain wording of the Unfair Trade Practices
chapter of the Montana Insurance Code. In resorting to the so-
called rules or statutory construction to reach this result, the ma-
jority has further ignored and tortured the rules of statutory con-
struction. The result is judicial legislation run rampant."
C. Klaudt's Procedural Problems
1. Evidence of Liability Insurance
Although Klaudt represents a major departure from former
substantive law, it may well be true that its procedural holdings
will create the greater difficulties in practice. The most significant
of the procedural matters is the court's determination that the
third party action can proceed ahead of, concurrently with, or after
the basic tort action.9 7 A long line of Montana cases beginning with
Vonault v. O'Rourke" has recognized the prejudice arising from,
and refused to allow, mention of insurance in typical tort actions.
D'Hoodge v. McCann" stated the general rule:
Under Montana law it is not permissible to convey to the jury in
a tort action that a defendant is protected by liability insur-
ance .... Ordinarily injection of the fact that defendant is pro-
tected by liability insurance into such a case, directly or indi-
rectly, by evidence, argument, or remarks constitutes reversible
93. Id. (Morrison, J., concurring and dissenting).
94. Id. (Weber, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at - , 658 P.2d at 1071 (Shea, J., dissenting).
96. Id. Justice Shea's dissent echoed a dissent in Royal Globe: "The gratuitous crea-
tion of such a new remedy is wholly inconsistent both with our own firmly established Cali-
fornia precedent, and with a fair and reasoned analysis of the applicable legislation." Royal
Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 898, 592 P.2d at 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (Richardson, J., concurring
and dissenting).
97. Klaudt, - Mont. at - , 658 P.2d at 1067. The court in Klaudt discussed only
one of the three reasons given in Royal Globe for not trying the action against the insurer
until after the action against the insured has been completed. See supra text accompanying
note 82.
98. 97 Mont. 92, 33 P.2d 535 (1934).
99. 151 Mont. 353, 443 P.2d 747 (1968).
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error.100
The adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence did not
change that rule. The commission comments to Rule 4110 state
that existing law is generally consistent with the rule.10 2 None of
the recognized exceptions to the general rule were present in the
circumstances in Klaudt. As recently as 1982, in Sioux v. Powell,103
the Montana court affirmed that introduction of evidence of liabil-
ity insurance is generally not admissible under Rule 411 or under
Montana case law.
An analysis of cases considering the issue reveals that the
court has regarded the mention of insurance coverage as immate-
rial, incompetent, and prejudicial.104 The mention of insurance is
considered prejudicial because it may result in an award of exces-
sive damages or an improper determination of liability. The court
has held that mere interjection of the fact that a defendant is pro-
tected by liability insurance constitutes reversible error. 05
2. Settlement Offers
Another consideration in the wake of the Klaudt decision in-
volves the admission at trial of offers to settle. Rule 408 of the
Montana Rules of Evidence'0 6 renders compromise offers and evi-
dence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations
inadmissible. In a third party claim seeking to establish bad faith
in failing to settle an action, most of the matters discussed during
negotiations, including the precise amounts of the offers and de-
mands, would undoubtedly need to be admitted. To inject the
100. Id. at 359, 443 P.2d at 750 (citations omitted).
101. MONT. R. EvID. 411 provides:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible
upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule
does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when of-
fered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias
or prejudice of a witness.
102. MONT. R. EvID. 411 commission comments.
103. __ Mont. __, 647 P.2d 861 (1982).
104. Id.; D'Hoodge v. McCann, 151 Mont. 353, 443 P.2d 747 (1968); Avery v. City of
Anaconda, 149 Mont. 495, 428 P.2d 465 (1967); Adams v. Misener, 113 Mont. 559, 131 P.2d
472 (1942); Vonault v. O'Rourke, 97 Mont. 92, 33 P.2d 535 (1934).
105. D'Hoodge, 151 Mont. at 359, 443 P.2d at 750.
106. MONT. R. EVD. 408 provides in part:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or at-
tempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible.
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amounts of offers and demands and other settlement negotiations
into the claimant's action against the tortfeasor-insured would be
highly prejudicial, particularly to the tortfeasor-insured.
The only advantage to the injured claimant in trying the bad
faith case before or simultaneously with the action against the
tortfeasor-insured would be to prevent delay in the third party
claim. This advantage is essentially illusory because a fair determi-
nation of the damages arising from an unfair insurance practice
would likely be closely related to the result against the insured
tortfeasor. Perhaps the most significant result of allowing an early
hearing on the third party claim is pressure on the insurance com-
pany to pay claims regardless of merit.
3. Separate Trials
The relationship between Klaudt and the rules on consolida-
tion and bifurcation of trials is also noteworthy. Rule 42(a) of the
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure 10 7 requires, as a prerequisite to
consolidation, that the actions involve common questions of law or
fact. Rule 42(b) 10 8 allows the court in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice to order separate trials of any issues or
claims, including third party claims. Neither of these rules was
mentioned in Klaudt. That failure is particularly surprising in
light of the court's holding in State ex rel. Hereim v. District
Court.109
Hereim involved an action for damages arising from an auto-
mobile collision. As the case developed, Hereim's insurer became
involved directly as a third party defendant. Relying on Vonault v.
O'Rourke,"0 D'Hoodge v. McCann,"' and other insurance cases,
the court found that the trial court had erred in denying a motion
for a separate trial of the third party complaint. The natural result
of a suggestion to the jury that the defendant was indemnified
against a judgment for damages would be highly prejudicial to his
107. MONT. R. Civ. P. 42(a) provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
108. MONT. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides:
The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a sepa-
rate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues.
109. 154 Mont. 112, 460 P.2d 755 (1969).
110. 97 Mont. 92, 33 P.2d 535 (1934).
111. 151 Mont. 353, 443 P.2d 747 (1968).
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rights, especially in a closely balanced case. The court found that
such a suggestion could not be avoided where the actions were con-
solidated.112 Separate trials would eliminate the possibility of
prejudice.11
4. Discovery
Another problem arising from Klaudt is the effect on the de-
fense of the insured of discovery accomplished in pursuing the
claim against the insurer. Such discovery would normally not be
permitted in the ordinary personal injury action. 114 In an action
against the insurer, matters dealing with settlement strategy, case
evaluation, work product, and preparation for litigation would pre-
sumably be discoverable, at least to some extent. Access to and
admission of this evidence could substantially prejudice the in-
sured tortfeasor, since it might lead to damages in excess of his
policy limits.
Traditionally, trial preparation materials and matters pecu-
liarly within the attorney's work product have not been discovera-
ble. 15 To determine whether the insurance carrier has exercised
good faith, however, the reasons for the decisions made with re-
spect to the insured and the third party claimant become relevant.
Discovery of those reasons entails discovery of the insurance com-
pany's documents and files relating to a particular claim. The
thoughts and evaluations of the person handling the claim on be-
half of the insurance company could thus become available to
plaintiff's counsel, and could be used in the action against the
tortfeasor. The effect of this information on the personal liability
of the tortfeasor could be devastating. If there were no such thing
as insurance policy limits, this simultaneous discovery might be
112. Hereim, 154 Mont. at 115-16, 460 P.2d at 757.
113. The supreme court recently denied an application for a writ of supervisory con-
trol in a case where the district court denied a motion for separate trials of the basic tort
and bad faith actions. State ex rel. Shalz v. District Court, No. 83-518 (Mont. Jan. 23, 1984)
(order denying writ of supervisory control). No satisfactory rule can be derived from that
order because of the fragmented opinions. Chief Justice Haswell and Justices Harrison and
Sheehy agreed that the question of separate trials is a matter of discretion for the trial
court. Justices Morrison, Weber, and Gulbrandson dissented on the basis that consolidating
the two actions works irreparable prejudice to the litigants. Justice Shea restated his disa-
greement with the majority holding in Klaudt, but concurred in the denial of the writ be-
cause he thought any change in the Klaudt consolidation rules should be based on the full
record of a trial where consolidation has occurred.
114. MONT. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2) does permit an injured party to discover "the existence
and contents of any insurance agreement" that may be used to satisfy a judgment, but it
does not authorize the party to discover materials generated by the insurer in assessing a
claim or preparing a defense.
115. MONT. R. Cxv. P. 26(b)(3).
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justifiable. If, however, one is to give the insured tortfeasor equal
consideration with the injured claimant, some restrictions must be
placed on discovery and use of this confidential information.
5. Conflicts of Interest
Clearly counsel representing the tortfeasor-insured will be un-
abte to represent the insurer in the third party claim. The interests
of the insured and the insurer under those circumstances would
almost inevitably diverge. Also, the attorney representing the in-
sured might be called as a witness in the third party claimant ac-
tion against the insurer.116 While claimant's need to obtain sepa-
rate counsel to prosecute the action against the insurance company
is not as clear, there undoubtedly would be situations where that
would be required. Claimant's attorney is likely to be called as a
witness in the third party claim against the insurance company be-
cause of his participation in settlement negotiations. Obviously,
this duplication would increase the cost of litigation where a bad
faith third party claim is asserted.
6. Dependency of Claims
Finally, Klaudt did not discuss the propriety of awaiting the
outcome of the claimant's action against the tortfeasor to assist in
the determination of damages in the third party action. Where the
statutory action is based on failure to exercise good faith in settle-
ment, anomalous results may occur if trial of the third party action
is not deferred until the basic tort action is concluded. A violation
of the statute may be found in a case where the claimant subse-
quently fails to recover against the alleged tortfeasor. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court apparently failed to consider that there could
be contrary findings in the two actions. It would be a strange result
indeed if an insurance company were held liable for not attempting
in good faith to settle a claim and another jury subsequently found
that the insured was not liable on the tort action by claimant.
D. After Klaudt
Since Klaudt there has been only one Montana decision in-
volving a third party claim. In Richardson v. Safeco Insurance
Co.,"1 7 the parties negotiated a settlement of an accident claim and
plaintiff signed a release of all claims against the insurer. After re-
116. See, e.g., Avila v. Travelers Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 431, 438 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
117. - Mont. -, 669 P.2d 1073 (1983).
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ceiving payment, plaintiff brought suit against the insurer and its
agent, alleging bad faith in the manner of settlement resulting in
emotional and mental distress.
The court held that plaintiff's claim, if any, against the insurer
had matured before the release was signed, and that plaintiff's fail-
ure to retain the right to sue barred action on the bad faith claim.
A different result might have occurred had the document specifi-
cally released only the insured from further liability and specifi-
cally reserved rights of action against the insurer.
The state of the law in third party actions against an insurer is
clearly in an early stage of development. At present, Montana rec-
ognizes the right of a third party claimant to proceed against an
insurer for violations of those duties specified in section 33-18-
201(6). The action by the third party claimant against the insurer
can proceed before, concurrently with, or after the action against
the tortfeasor. Joint trial of the statutory violation and the per-
sonal injury action does not violate Montana law, although it in-
volves discussion of insurance in apparent violation of Rule 411. In
order to establish a statutory violation it is necessary to show a
general business practice of unfair claim settlement practices. Such
a practice can be shown by more than one act within the handling
of the same claim. A general release of the insurer from all claims
arising from the accident results in the release of all claims, includ-
ing bad faith claims arising prior to the execution of such release.
VI. BAD FAITH IN OTHER CONTEXTS
A. Employment Cases
Two recent decisions arising out of the same lawsuit have pro-
vided the basis for a potential expansion of the tort of bad faith to
other contractual relationships. Gates v. Life of Montana Insur-
ance Co.118 (Gates I) involved an oral at will employment contract.
Among other claims, plaintiff sought relief for breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the tort of wrongful
discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Gates I
involved an appeal from a summary judgment entered for defen-
dant. The court found that there is a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing implied in an employment contract, even one "at
will." 9 It specifically referred to the requirement of good faith in
118. - Mont. -, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982).
119. Id. at -, 638 P.2d at 1067.
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insurance contracts and in commercial transactions. 0 The court
recognized the necessity of balancing the interests of the employer
in controlling his work force with the interests of the employee in
job security.
Gates I also examined the question of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and found that cause of action defective. The
court noted that plaintiff had testified she was "rather disturbed"
and "kind of in shock."' 2 1 Citing Helton v. Reserve Life Insurance
Co., 22 the court held that these allegations were insufficient to en-
title claimant to recover. The matter was remanded for a resolu-
tion of factual issues in the bad faith action.
Upon remand and jury trial, plaintiff was awarded $1891 in
compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. The trial
court entered judgment for plaintiff on the compensatory damages
but granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of de-
fendant on punitive damages.
In Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co.'2 3 (Gates II), the
essential question was whether punitive damages could be awarded
for violation of the covenant to deal fairly with an employee. The
court found the employer's duty to deal fairly to exist apart from
and in addition to any contractual terms agreed upon by the par-
ties.'2 4 In that respect, the duty of good faith and fair dealing aris-
ing in an employment context is similar to that arising from an
insurance contract. The court held that, because the duty was im-
posed by operation of law, its breach has a remedy in tort.' 2. The
court reinstated the award of punitive damages.
Thus Gates I and Gates If clearly establish that a duty of
good faith and fair dealing can arise as an extra-contractual obliga-
tion out of a contractual relationship. The correlative tort action of
"bad faith" provides a remedy for violation of that duty.
Another recent case outside the insurance context is signifi-
cant for its ruling on a venue question in a bad faith action. In
Whalen v. Snell,"2 6 an attorney sought to collect an unpaid fee.
120. Id. at -, 638 P.2d at 1066 (citing MoNr. CODE ANN. § 30-1-203 (1983)).
121. Id. at -, 638 P.2d at 1067.
122. 399 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Mont. 1975).
123. - Mont. -, 668 P.2d 213 (1983).
124. Id. at -, 668 P.2d at 214.
125. Id. at -, 668 P.2d at 215. The court cited Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., - Mont.
, 655 P.2d 970 (1982), where punitive damages for bad faith insurance practices were
upheld in the absence of any statutory violation. Dissenting, Justice Gulbrandson noted that
all other jurisdictions permit an independent tort of bad faith (and thus punitive damages)
in an at will contract only when the employee's termination violates public policy. Gates II,
- Mont. at -, 668 P.2d at 220 (Gulbrandson, J., dissenting).
126. - Mont. -, 667 P.2d 436 (1983).
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The complaint also alleged bad faith on the defendant's part in
repudiating his obligation to pay, and sought punitive damages.
The attorney's office and the services at issue were performed in
Yellowstone County, but defendant resided in Garfield County and
claimed it as the proper venue. The Montana Supreme Court ac-
knowledged the general rule that the proper venue is the county
where the defendant resides, noting the exceptions for contract ac-
tions and tort actions, which may be tried in the county where
they were performed or committed.'2 7 Rather than differentiate be-
tween the tort or contract rule the court simply held that the com-
plaint sounded in tort and that the bad faith occurred, if at all, in
Yellowstone County, because payment was to be made there. 28
Apparently, any county in which the complained of activity oc-
curred can be an appropriate venue for a bad faith action.
B. Workers' Compensation
Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters2 " established that a claim-
ant has the right to bring an action in district court against an
insurer and its adjuster for independent intentional torts commit-
ted in the processing of a workers' compensation claim. The court
found that such an action did not violate the exclusivity of the
statutory workers' compensation remedy' 30 because the tortious
conduct that gave rise to the action did not arise out of the original
employment relationship. This result was noted as controlling in
Vigue v. Evans Products Co., 8' where the claim was for inten-
tional torts in the adjustment of the claim or the presence of bad
faith. Thus the tort of bad faith has reached an area where reme-
dies have traditionally been limited by statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
The tort of bad faith is here to stay. The private right of ac-
tion derived from section 33-18-201 is probably firmly established
also. Expansion of the tort of bad faith into other traditionally
contractual areas is likely to continue. The implied duties of good
faith and fair dealing will continue to spawn variations of tort re-
covery, at least in situations where parties to a contract have une-
qual bargaining positions. Private rights of action based on statu-
127. Id. at -, 667 P.2d at 437.
128. Id.
129. - Mont. -, 609 P.2d 257 (1980).
130. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411 (1983).
131. - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 488 (1980).
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tory duties may lead to further possibilities of tort recovery, since
other legislation designed to regulate industry may be subject to
Klaudt-type interpretation.
As the law continues to develop in this area, more precise
statements of the elements of bad faith will be articulated. Cases
to date have presented somewhat different views as to the ele-
ments, depending on the factual setting and the particular basis
for the bad faith claim.
Other questions remaining unanswered involve statutes of lim-
itation and assessment of damages. First party actions may include
both contract and tort claims. If the contract action controls, limi-
tations could be based on a written insurance contract (or other
controlling contract), on an oral contract such as an at will employ-
ment contract, or on the implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing."8 2 If tort limitations apply, actions would have to com-
mence within three years."" In third party actions, the court would
presumably be guided by the two-year statute of limitations for a
liability created by statute,"3 4 since third party actions are based
on Insurance Code violations.
At this time it is not certain that damages for mental and
emotional pain and suffering can be recovered. The cases make it
clear that an assessment of punitive damages in a bad faith action
is appropriate. The malice traditionally required for recovery of
punitive damages can, in bad faith cases, be actual or implied."3 5
The Montana Supreme Court has not, however, retreated from
long-established principles delineating the purpose and scope of
punitive damage awards. The plaintiff is never entitled to punitive
damages as a matter of right, without regard to the situation or
sufficiency of evidence.13 6 Particularized circumstances of intent
132. The applicable statute, MoNT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-202 (1983), prescribes periods of
eight years for actions on "any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument
in writing," five years for actions on "a contract, account, or promise not founded on an
instrument in writing," and three years for actions on other obligations or liabilities.
133. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-204 (1983).
134. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-211 (1983).
135. The supreme court recently adopted an explicit standard for presumed malice:
When a person knows or has reason to know of facts which create a high
degree of risk of harm to the substantial interests of another, and either deliber-
ately proceeds to act in conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk, or reck-
lessly proceeds in unreasonable disregard of or indifference to that risk, his con-
duct meets the standard of willful, wanton, and/or reckless to which the law of
this State will allow imposition of punitive damages on the basis of presumed
malice.
Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., - Mont. -, P.2d - , 41 St. Rptr. 66, 69 (1984).
136. Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 147 Mont. 500, 414 P.2d 918 (1966).
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and aggravation must be present before such an award is made.137
Such awards are proper only where the conduct at issue is of such
a nature as to require additional penalty for warning, deterrent,
and punishment."'8
Because of the crippling procedural problems, the authors
urge that Klaudt be modified to allow the trial of the third party
action against an insurer to proceed only after trial or settlement
of the claimant's action against the tortfeasor.
The emerging bad faith law has as its impetus a realignment
of the previous inequalities in bargaining position between in-
sureds or claimants and insurance carriers or employers. Some ad-
justments in those relationships were undoubtedly needed.
One must keep in mind, however, that recognition and exalta-
tion of an individual's rights to the neglect of public or societal
rights can be destructive. Spreading to many the cost of an injury
to one may serve a valid public interest. When windfall awards,
however, are spread too frequently among members of the public,
the utility of the theory diminishes. It must not be forgotten that
the public at large as policyholders and premium-payers are also
the ultimate judgment debtors. As problems present themselves
for solutions in the area of bad faith the courts must remain cogni-
zant of all of these interests and only through a reasonable recogni-
tion and balancing will justice obtain.
137. Butcher v. Petranek, 181 Mont. 358, 593 P.2d 743 (1979).
138. First Security Bank v. Goddard, 181 Mont. 407, 423, 593 P.2d 1040, 1049 (1979).
For a discussion of the need to distinguish between the conduct giving rise to tort liability
and the nature of the conduct justifying punitive damages, see Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v.
Barns, 405 So. 2d 916 (Ala. 1981).
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